Unreliable failure detectors are oracles that give information about process failures. Chandra and Toueg were first to study such failure detectors for distributed systems, and they identified a number that enabled the solution of the Consensus problem in asynchronous distributed systems. This paper focuses on two of these, denoted S (strong) and 3S (eventually strong).
Introduction
Background. It has been proven that several practical agreement problems such as atomic broadcast, leader election, group membership and atomic commit, encountered in the design of reliable applications built on top of unreliable asynchronous distributed systems, cannot be solved in a deterministic way [5, 12] . Many agreement problems can be characterized by a single problem, namely the Consensus problem. This means that any solution to Consensus can be used as a building block on top of which solutions to particular agreement problems can be designed. From a theoretical point of view, this means that an agreement problem cannot be solved in systems where Consensus cannot be solved. This is due to the uncertainty created by asynchrony and failures: their combination can actually prevent processes from making consistent decisions. 1 From an operational point of view, this is due to the impossibility of a process distinguishing Notice that the correctness condition of the transformation protocol (namely, f < k) does not require the assumption that a majority of processes always remain correct. This has an interesting practical consequence: when f is small (i.e., n), k (the accuracy scope) too can be small ( n). This is particularly attractive when facing fault-tolerance or scaling problems. In an extreme example, this means that the Consensus problem can be solved in presence of one process failure (i.e., f = 1) in an asynchronous distributed system equipped with a failure detector in S 2 , since the transformation protocol yields a failure detector in S which can be used to solve Consensus [1] . (S 2 contains failure detectors for which there is a correct process p i that is never suspected by some other process p j .)
The paper is made up of six sections. Section 2 introduces the computation model and the failure detectors of Chandra and Toueg. Section 3 defines the classes of limited accuracy failure detectors. Section 4.1 then presents and proves correct, for f < k, a protocol transforming S k (respectively, 3S k ) into S (respectively, 3S). Section 5 shows there is no such protocol when f ≥ k. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Asynchronous Distributed Systems and Unreliable Failure Detectors

Asynchronous Systems with Process Crashes and Fair Lossy Links
We consider a system to consist of a finite set Π of n > 1 processes, namely, Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }. Each process has a unique identity. A process can fail by crashing, i.e., by prematurely halting. It behaves correctly (i.e., according to its specification) until it (possibly) crashes. By definition, a correct process is a process that does not crash. A faulty process is a process that is not correct. As previously indicated, f < n denotes the maximum number of processes that can crash.
Processes communicate and synchronize by sending and receiving messages through channels. Every pair of processes is connected by a channel. Channels do not create or alter messages. They are not required to deliver messages in order. Moreover, they may lose messages provided that, if a process p i sends an infinite number of messages to a process p j and if p j executes receive actions infinitely often, p j receives an infinite number of messages from p i (this is a fair lossy channel assumption). Finally, there is no assumption about the relative speed of processes or message transfer delays.
The protocol proposed in Section 4 is correct under the assumptions detailed above; it tolerates fair lossy channels that may deliver messages out of order. The impossibility result of Section 5 applies even to systems with channels that never lose message and always deliver them in order.
Chandra-Toueg's Unreliable Failure Detectors
Informally, a failure detector consists of a set of modules, each one attached to a process: the module attached to p i maintains a set (named suspected i ) of processes it currently suspects to have crashed. Any failure-detector module is inherently unreliable: it can make mistakes by not suspecting a crashed process or by erroneously suspecting a correct one. Moreover, suspicions are not necessarily stable: a process p j can be added to or removed from a set suspected i according to whether p i 's failure-detector module currently suspects p j or not. As in other papers devoted to failure detectors, we say "process p i suspects process p j " at some time t, if we have p j ∈ suspected i at that time.
As indicated in Section 1, a failure-detector class is formally defined by two abstract properties, namely a Completeness property and an Accuracy property. In this paper, we consider the following completeness property defined by Chandra and Toueg [1] :
• Strong Completeness: Eventually, every process that crashes is permanently suspected by every correct process.
Among the accuracy properties defined by Chandra and Toueg we consider here the following two:
• Perpetual Weak Accuracy: Some correct process is never suspected by any process.
• Eventual Weak Accuracy: There is a time after which some correct process is never suspected by any process.
Combined with Strong Completeness, these accuracy properties define the following two classes of failure detectors [1] :
• S: The class of Strong failure detectors. This class contains all the failure detectors that satisfy the strong completeness property and the perpetual weak accuracy property.
• 3S: The class of Eventually Strong failure detectors. This class contains all the failure detectors that satisfy the strong completeness property and the eventual weak accuracy property.
Clearly, S ⊆ 3S.
Failure Detectors with Limited Weak Accuracy
Limited Weak Accuracy
As noted in Section 2.2, the weak accuracy properties involve all the correct processes, and consequently spans the whole system. This "whole-system spanning" suggest that weak accuracy might be easier to satisfy if it involved only a subset of processes (one of which is correct and never suspected by the others). This observation motivates the following definition, where the parameter k defines the scope of the accuracy property. For set of processes Q and process p ∈ Q, k-accuracy is Q, p -satisfied if the following hold:
1. Scope: |Q| = k.
No suspicion:
p is correct and is not suspected by any process q ∈ Q.
A failure detector satisfies perpetual (respectively, eventual) weak k-accuracy is satisfied if, for each execution, there is a set of processes Q and process p ∈ Q such that k-accuracy is Q, p -satisfied at all times (respectively, after some point in time) in that execution. (Different executions may use different sets Q and processes p.) Given a scope parameter k, we get the two following classes of failure detectors in the style of Chandra and Toueg:
• S k . This class contains all the failure detectors that satisfy strong completeness and perpetual weak k-accuracy.
• 3S k . This class contains all the failure detectors that satisfy strong completeness and eventual weak k-accuracy.
Clearly, S k ⊆ 3S k and, for each k < n, S k+1 ⊆ S k and 3S k+1 ⊆ 3S k . It is easy to see that "traditional" (unlimited) weak accuracy is obtained with k = n. More precisely, S n = S and 3S n = 3S. Moreover, S 1 contains failure detectors whose accuracy need have no scope (i.e., such failure detector need not provide any information). For this reason, the rest of this paper considers only failure detectors with k-accuracy where k > 1.
Related Work
Guerraoui and Schiper [6] used failure detectors with a kind of limited-scope accuracy to address problems raised by distributed system partitioning. They assumed that a minority of processes crash and that the scope of the failure detector comprises a majority of processes, i.e., f < n/2 < k. Failure detectors with limited-scope accuracy (or limited-scope failure detectors) were previously investigated by Yang, Neiger, and Gafni [15] , who defined the failure-detector classes S k and 3S k using a slightly different notation (they used S k for the class denoted here S n+1−k ). A part of their work focused on the K-set agreement problem. 2 They proved that K-Set Agreement can be solved (1) with S n+1−K for any number of failures and (2) with 3S n+1−K if n > 2f .
A 3S k -based Consensus protocol was presented by Mostefaoui and Raynal [10] . It requires f < min(k, n/2). The same authors also investigated limited-scope failure detectors to solve the K-Set Agreement problem [11] . They proposed two protocols. The first considers an underlying failure detector of the class S k and requires f < K + k − 1. The second considers a failure detector of the class 3S k and requires f < max(K, max 1≤α≤K (min(n − α n/(α + 1) , α + k − 1))).
Failure detectors where both the completeness property and the accuracy property hold on subsets of correct processes have been investigated by Raynal and Tronel [13] . Their completeness and accuracy properties are restricted in the following sense: they are not required to involve all the correct processes but only k 1 and k 2 of them (k 1 are involved in the completeness property, and k 2 in the accuracy property). It is shown that transforming such restricted failure detectors into their non-restricted counterparts requires k 1 + k 2 > n (for the transformation to be safe) and max(k 1 , k 2 ) ≤ n − f (for the transformation to be live).
From k-Accuracy to Full Accuracy
This section describes a protocol for process p i (given in Figure 1 ) that transforms any failure detector of either class S k or 3S k into a failure detector the corresponding class with unlimited accuracy. That is, if the input failure detector is in S k (respectively, 3S k ), then the resulting failure detector is in S (respectively, 3S). Although the constant k does not appear explicitly in the protocol text, the protocol's correctness condition requires f < k (see Section 4.2). Surpisingly, the proposed transformation protocol is quite simple.
A Protocol
In Figure 1 , process p i consults its underlying failure detector (S k or 3S k ) whenever it refers to the set pseudovariable lim suspect i . If p ∈ lim suspect i , we say "p i lim-suspects p ". The protocol provides the upper layer with a set denoted suspected i . When ∈ suspected i we say "p i suspects p ". Section 4.2 will prove that the sets suspect i have the properties required of the target failure detector (S or 3S).
To ensure that the suspected i sets satisfy the properties defined by S (respectively, 3S), processes continually exchange their lim suspect i sets. More precisely, p i 's behavior is made up of two tasks. The task T 1 periodically sends lim suspect i to all processes (including itself). The task T 2 is an infinite loop in which p i first receives lim suspect sets from (n − f ) distinct processes and then defines the current value of suspected i as their intersection.
(1) init:
repeat forever (2) foreach j do send SUSPICION(lim suspect i ) to pj enddo end repeat task T 2:
repeat forever (3) wait until SUSPICION(lim suspect) received from (n − f ) distinct processes ; (4) let X= the set of the lim suspect sets received at the previous line;
Proof of Correctness
Theorem 1 Let f < k. The protocol described in Figure 1 transforms any failure detector in S k (respectively, in 3S k ) into a failure detector in S (respectively, in 3S).
Proof The proof comprises two parts, addressing the strong completeness property and the perpetual/eventual weak accuracy property, respectively.
Strong completeness.
Note first that (by assumption) the underlying failure detector (whether it belongs to S k or to 3S k ) satisfies strong completeness. We show that the protocol preserves this property, i.e., if a process p crashes and if p i is correct, then eventually p remains permanently in suspected i .
First observe that there is a time t after which all faulty processes have crashed. Moreover, there is a time t ≥ t after which all SUSPICION messages that are received (1) have been sent by correct processes and (2) carry the identity of p (as the underlying failure detector satisfies strong completeness). Furthermore, as at most f processes crash and the channels are fair lossy, each correct process p i infinitely often receives SUSPICION messages from (n − f ) different processes, and after t all those messages carry the identity of p . It follows that, after t , line 5 is executed infinitely often and, each time it is executed after t , p belongs to X. Thus, there is a time after which every crashed process is suspected by every correct process.
2. Perpetual/eventual weak accuracy. Consider first the case in which the underlying failure detector belongs to 3S k . Thus, the lim suspect i sets satisfy eventual weak k-accuracy. We show that the suspected i sets satisfy eventual weak accuracy.
Consider a specific execution of the protocol. By definition, there is a set of a processes Q and a process p ∈ Q such that k-accuracy is Q, p -satisfied after some point in time in that execution. More specifically, there is a time t, a set Q, and a correct process p ∈ Q such that |Q| = k and, after t, p is never lim-suspected by any of the processes in Q. Let t ≥ t be a time after which no SUSPICION messages are received that were sent by the processes of Q before t.
After t , p can appear in the SUSPICION messages of at most (n − k) processes (namely the processes in Π − Q). As k > f , we have n − f > n − k, from which we conclude that, at line 4, there is at least one SUSPICION message that does not carry the identity of p. It follows that after t , p can no longer appear in a set suspected i for any process p i . Hence, the eventual weak accuracy property holds.
If the underlying lim suspect i sets satisfy perpetual weak k-accuracy (i.e., the underlying failure detector belongs to S k ), the proof that the suspected i sets satisfy perpetual weak accuracy property is the same as previously, considering t = t = 0.
2 T heorem 1
An Impossibility Result
The previous transformation relies on the condition f < k. This section shows that this condition is actually necessary: no such transformation is possible if f ≥ k > 0. The proof of the impossibility result relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 There is no protocol that implements a failure detector of class 3S in an asynchronous distributed system where f > 0.
Proof The proof is by contradiction and is as follows. We first assume that there is a protocol P implementing a failure detector FD of the class 3S in an asynchronous system Σ with n > f > 0. We then use the strong completeness property of FD to construct a fault-free execution of the protocol P in which FD does not satisfy the eventual weak accuracy property. Since FD was assumed to be in 3S and thus satisfy eventual weak accuracy in all executions, we will have a contradiction, implying that protocol P cannot exist.
For the sake of contradiction, assume there is a protocol P implementing FD, a failure detector in the class 3S in system Σ. P thus provides each process p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with a set suspected i (holding the processes that p i currently suspects). We use suspected i (t) to denote the value of such a set at time t. We will construct an execution E of P in Σ such that the following both hold:
1. E is fault-free (no process fails).
2. There is an infinite sequence of times t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < · · · such that, for all i > 0, process p ((i−1) mod n)+1 is suspected by all other processes at time t i (i.e., (∀j = (
Clearly, in the execution E of P , each process is infinitely often suspected by the other processes and, consequently, the eventual weak accuracy is not satisfied.
For simplicity, we define t 0 = 0. We will construct execution E inductively. For i ≥ 0, assume that E is already constructed up to time t i−1 (t 0 in the base case); we show how to define t i and construct the interval (t i−1 , t i ] of the execution E such that item (2) above is satisfied for the value i.
Consider another execution E i of P in Σ that is identical to E up to time t i−1 and in which p ((i−1) mod n)+1 crashes after t i−1 and all other processes are correct. By strong completeness, there is some time t after which P has all correct processes (i.e., all but p ((i−1) mod n)+1 ) permanently suspect p ((i−1) mod n)+1 . Let t i = max t, t i−1 + 1, and make E behave in the interval (t i−1 , t i ] as follows:
• Process p ((i−1) mod n)+1 does not crash, but all the messages it sends during this interval remain undelivered at the end of the interval (namely, at t i ). Messages sent by p ((i−1) mod n)+1 in [0, t i−1 ] but not delivered in that interval are delivered (or not) in (t i−1 , t i ] of E exactly as they are (or not) in that interval of E i .
• The other processes behave as they do in the interval
of E exactly as they are (or not) in that interval of E i .
The above imply that each process p j , j = ((i − 1) mod n) + 1 cannot distinguish executions E i and E through time t i . Since all processes but p ((i−1) mod n)+1 ) suspect p ((i−1) mod n)+1 at time t i of E i , they also suspect p ((i−1) mod n)+1 at time t i of E. Repeating this process for every i > 0, we construct an infinite sequence of intervals that constitutes the execution E. Hence we have the execution E that has the properties 1 and 2 mentioned above, which completes the proof.
2 Lemma 1
There is no protocol transforming any failure detector in S k into a failure detector in 3S.
Proof Consider a system Σ with n processes of which up to f ≥ k may fail. Assume for a contradiction that, in Σ, any failure detector in S k can be converted into a failure detector in 3S. Partition Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } into sets A and B as follows:
Consider a failure detector FD with the following properties:
• In executions in which all processes in B crash (such crashes can occur as f ≥ k > |B|), the process suspicions are as follows:
-Each process in A always suspects all processes except itself.
-Each process in B never suspects any process.
• In executions in which some process in B is correct, FD satisfies strong completeness and perpetual weak accuracy.
Let us first show that FD is in the class S k . This is done through the following cases:
• Consider any execution in which all processes in B crash. This implies that each correct process always suspects all processes except itself; thus, each correct process eventually permanently suspects all faulty processes, satisfying strong completeness. In addition, let p ∈ A be a correct process (such a process must exist as n > f ) and consider the set Q = {p} ∪ B. Clearly, |Q| = k and Q contains a correct process, p. Moreover, no process in Q ever suspects p: p never suspects itself, and the other processes in Q never suspect any process. Thus, k-accuracy is always Q, p -satisfied in this execution. Thus, FD satisfies perpetual weak k-accuracy.
• Consider any execution in which some process in B is correct. By definition, the failure detector satisfies strong completeness and perpetual weak accuracy. The latter implies that it always Q, psatisfies k-accuracy for any set Q such that p ∈ Q and |Q| = k. Thus, FD satisfies perpetual weak k-accuracy.
Assume for a contradiction that C is a protocol that transforms FD into a failure detector in 3S. Let Σ be a system made up of a set Π of n = n − (k − 1) processes p 1 . . . , p n−(k−1) of which f = f − (k − 1) can fail (notice f ≥ k implies f > 0). We will use C to construct a protocol C that will implement a failure detector of class 3S in Σ with no underlying failure detector.
C has each process p i ∈ Π emulate protocol C, running it with the following exceptions:
• p i never sends a message to any p j , n − (k − 1) < j ≤ n (there is no such p j ∈ Π ).
• Whenever C would have p i consult FD, C has p i behave as if FD has returned the set X = {p | 1 ≤ ≤ n ∧ = i}. (Notice that this is consistent with the definition of FD when the all processes in B have crashed.)
• Whenever C would report report a set X for 3S in Σ, C will report X \ B in Σ .
We now show that the protocol C implements a failure detector of the class 3S in Σ without the help of an underlying failure detector. Let us consider any execution E of C in Σ . The processes' emulation of C corresponds exactly to their behavior in an execution E of C in Σ with FD in which each process in B crashes before sending any message (thus the following refers only to p i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n − (k − 1)). Because C implements a failure detector of class 3S in Σ augmented with FD (from S k ), we conclude that C implements a failure detector of class 3S in Σ with no underlying failure detector. More precisely, we have the following:
• Strong Completeness. If a process p i crashes in E during the emulation C , the same process has crashed in E and, by the strong completeness of C in Σ with FD, p i will be permanently suspected by all correct processes in the emulation C .
• Eventual Weak Accuracy. If p i is correct in E , it is also correct in E. Thus, each process correct in E will eventually never suspect p i in E. Since each process correct in E is also correct in E and any process suspected in E is also suspected in E, each process correct in E will eventually never suspect p i in E .
If a process p i is not suspected by some correct process p j (note that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − (k − 1)) in E, the same holds for the emulation C , and consequently the failure detector obtained with C satisfies eventual weak accuracy.
Since f > 0, C implements a failure detector of class 3S in a system with at least one failure and without the help of an underlying failure detector. This contradicts Lemma 1. Thus, the assumption stating that S k can be converted to 3S in a system with f ≥ k is erroneous.
2 Lemma 2 Theorem 2 Let f ≥ k. There is no protocol transforming any failure detector in S k (respectively, 3S k ) into a failure detector in S (respectively, 3S).
Proof This theorem follows directly from the definitions of S k and 3S k (which states S k ⊆ 3S k ), the definitions of S and 3S (which states S ⊆ 3S), and Lemma 2. 2 T heorem 2
Conclusion
The scope of the accuracy property of an unreliable failure detector is the minimum number k of processes that must not suspect a correct process. Such a scope definition has allowed us to define the classes of failure detectors S k and 3S k . The well-known failure detectors S and 3S implicitly consider a scope equal to n (the total number of processes). This paper has addressed the following question: "Given S k and 3S k , under which condition is it possible to transform their failure detectors into failure detectors of S and 3S, respectively?". The paper has answered this question in the following way. Let T (n, f, k) be the predicate "there is a transformation from S k (respectively, 3S k ) to S (respectively, 3S) in a system with n processes of which f may fail". Sections 4.1 and 5 have shown the following:
(∀n, f, k) ((f < k ⇔ T (n, f, k)).
